R v Coskun 2025


C came from Turkey to the UK seeking asylum. Since he'd left Turkey, his country had moved from being a secular state to becoming more Islamic. C disapproved of this so went to the Turkish Consulate, stood outside, and set fire to a copy of the Koran. Whilst doing so, he was shouting and swearing and stated that Islam is the religion of terrorism. There weren't many people around him and he didn't initiate any interaction with anyone there. However, a man (K) came out from a nearby building holding a knife, chased C into the road and made slashing motions towards him with the knife. C fell to the ground and K kicked and spat on him. Another attacker, a passing delivery cyclist, also kicked and spat at C. This attacker cycled away.
 
Upon police arrival, C told them that he had been exercising his right to protest and that he'd been attacked. Both C and K were arrested (K was subsequently convicted of assault and possession of a knife).
 
In interview, C stated that the Koran incites people to opt for terrorism and should be forbidden, and he had a right to burn it. C also stated that he was not racist and did not intend to incite racial hatred.
 
C was convicted of the racially aggravated form of the section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 offence.

C appealed against his conviction on the grounds that -
  1. His conduct did not reach the level required to amount to "disorderly conduct". 
  2. His conduct may have upset at least one person but did not meet the legal test of "likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress".
  3. Given the political nature of his protest, the Court should find his conduct "reasonable".
  4. His conduct may have been motivated by a hostility to Islam but the Court should recognise and honour the distinction that C drew (at one stage in his interviews under caution) between a hostility to a faith and a hostility to adherents to that religion.
The prosecution accepted that there is no law that criminalises blasphemy, but their case was that C's choice to burn the Koran, knowing full well how upsetting that act would be to any Muslim, in combination with the shouted comments, was an ample basis to find the offence proved in its aggravated form. It was submitted that although K's actions were deplorable and unlawful, this did illustrate that people were distressed by C's conduct. Also, C's responses in interview could be viewed as evidence of his hostility towards Muslims when viewing the actions he took and the offence. The prosecution asserted that conduct was motivated, at least partly, by hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group.
 
C chose not to give evidence before the Crown Court and his Counsel advised him about a possible adverse inference for his failure to testify. The question therefore also arose for the Crown Court as to whether section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 permits an adverse inference from a defendant choosing not to give evidence applies in appeal proceedings as it would at trial? 


Held


Appeal allowed. 
 
An appeal to the Crown Court was by way of rehearing. Therefore, the section 35 adverse inference does apply to an appeal by way of rehearing. However, there was no assistance by an adverse inference from C choosing not to testify on the issues of whether the impugned conduct was "disorderly" or whether it was "likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress", both being objective decisions for the Court to take and therefore, had no bearing on the determination of this case.
 
C's conduct could not properly be found to be disorderly and was not within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.
 
C’s actions were a political speech and conduct, and insulting conduct is not sufficient to make out the offence charged. C acted alone, during daylight, outside the Turkish Consulate – a recognised place for political protests - and his conduct was not aimed at a person. While such a generalised protest might amount to an offence under section 5, it is less likely to do so than one where the conduct or words are directed at a person or people. The reaction of people who were present is not determinative. The section 5 offence criminalises the effect of conduct that is likely, not that which actually transpires. Yet the reactions of those who witness the event in real time can be relevant as it allows some insight into the sound, feel and appearance of the impugned conduct. Although 2 people did react to C with their own anger and aggression, this is not the same as being harassed, alarmed or distressed and others present displayed a casual reaction to a lone man, on a fairly empty pavement, setting fire to a book in a short protest – and this was telling to the court. Further, as articulated in Abdul and others V DPP and Brutus v Cozens, the Courts should be wary of allowing the criminal reaction of one person to make a criminal of another for exercising their right to free speech.
 
View the full case document here, with links to related legislation and similar cases.

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